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Donovan v. Bachstadt, 181 N.J. Super. 367, 437 A.2d 728 (1981),
certif. granted, 89 N.J. 403, 446 A.2d 138 (1982).
Nowhere has the impact of the rampant rise of inflation during
the last decade been felt more than in the American housing sector.'
Homeowners and prospective home buyers have been made well
aware of this impact through one of inflation's unpleasant corollaries-the erratic rise of interest rates for home mortgages. 2 In
Donovan v. Bachstadt,3 the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey recognized the potential injury that the inconstant
increase in interest rates may have on a purchaser of real estate. In
Donovan, the court held that the costs incurred by a purchaser of real
estate who is forced to obtain a new home loan commitment at a
higher interest rate because of the seller's breach of a contract for sale
were compensable elements of damage. 4 Although the court was
cognizant of the difficulties surrounding the calculation of damages in
such a volatile area, 5 it is unclear whether the Donovan court set an
appropriate formula to aid in such computation.

Edward and Donna Donovan entered into a contract to purchase
a home from Carl Bachstadt on January 19, 1980.0

The contract

I Statistics compiled in the Consumer Price Index show that the cost of living had risen an
unprecedented 210% during the period of 1970-80. ECONOMIC STATISTICS BUREAU OF WASHINGTON, D.C., 25 THE HANDBOOK OF BASIC ECONOMIC STATISTICS No. 1, 99-100 (Jan. 1982); U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERcE, BURAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 486
(101st ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ASTsAcr].
I In 1981 alone, interest rates for a conventional home mortgage with a term of 30 years
rose from 15.4% in January, to 16.88% in June and then peaked at 18.23% in October before
declining to 17.5% at the year's end. (Statistics represent mortgages with 30 year term to
maturity at a 75% loan-to-price ratio). F DE.RL HOME LOAN BANK BD. NEws BULLETIN, (March
5, 1982); FEDMAL RESERVE BULLETIN, DOMESTIC FIN. STATISTICS, A-3 (Jan. 1982).
3 181 N.J. Super. 367, 437 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1981), certif. granted, 89 N.J. 403, 446
A.2d 138 (1982).
4 Id. at 375-76, 437 A.2d at 733. Since the difference between what a home purchaser
would have paid under an expired mortgage commitment and what he would have paid under a
new mortgage at a higher interest rate was held to be ascertainable within a reasonable degree of
certainty, a claim by the seller that these damages were too remote was determined by the court
to be without merit. Id.; see also infa notes 28-31 & 71-77 and accompanying text; Garland,
PurchasersInterest Rate Increases: Caveat Venditor, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript copy on file at Seton Hall Law Review).
5 181 N.J. Super. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733.
6 Id. at 368, 437 A.2d at 729. The property, located in Middletown Township, had a
purchase price of $58,900. Id. Also, it is interesting to note that at the time the parties entered
into the agreement, neither was represented by counsel. Brief for Appellant at 5, Donovan v.
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required Bachstadt to take back a purchase-money mortgage 7 of
$44,000 for a term of thirty years at an interest rate of thirteen
percent. 8 Although Mr. Bachstadt apparently never represented to
the Donovans the status of the title in the property, at the time the
parties entered into the contract of sale, Mr. Bachstadt did not actually own the property. 9 Rather, he had intended to purchase the
property before the Donovan closing' 0 from Joan Lowden, whom he
believed to be the record owner of the property, thereby enabling him
to transfer good title to the Donovans. 1
In February, 1980, the parties became aware of a possible flaw in
the arrangement between Mr. Bachstadt and Ms. Lowden. 12 Upon
requesting title insurance, the Donovans were informed that a title
search of the property revealed that title was vested in Anthony and
Jane Mettrick, and Joan Lowden was not the record owner.' 3 Ms.

Lowden had supposedly obtained title to the property from Middletown Township after a tax foreclosure action was conducted against
the Mettricks in 1977.14 The title search revealed that because of
improprieties in the foreclosure proceedings, the Mettricks were never
divested of title, which ultimately prevented the township from receiving the good title which Ms. Lowden believed she had properly
obtained. 15
When the date scheduled for closing had passed, the Donovans
filed suit for specific performance and reduction of the interest rate in
Bachstadt, 181 N.J. Super. 367, 437 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant].
7See C. OsBoRNE, C. NELsoN & D. WHrrMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1, at 1-5
(1979). "A purchase-money mortgage arises where the mortgagor's acquisition of the mortgaged
real estate is financed by the mortgagee-lender. Often a seller of real estate will take back a
purchase-money mortgage for part of the purchase price." Id. § 1.1, at 1.
8 181 N.J. Super. at 369, 437 A.2d at 729. The original interest rate of 13% was found to be
usurious at subsequent court proceedings and ultimately reduced to 10 / %. Id.; see also infra
note 17 and accompanying text.
9 181 N.J. Super. at 369, 437 A.2d at 729; Brief for Respondent at 2, 5, Donovan v.
Bachstadt, 181 N.J. Super. 367, 437 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Respondent).
10 181 N.J Super. at 369, 437 A.2d at 729. The date for closing was scheduled for May 1,
1980. Id.
"1 Id.
Although the Donovans admitted that Mr. Bachstadt never made any affirmative
representations about title being vested in him at the time the contract was executed, the
contract did include a clause requiring the seller to convey marketable title. It is unclear whether
the Donovans actually had knowledge of Mr. Bachstadt's plan for obtaining title. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 9, at 2.
It 181 N.J. Super at 369, 437 A.2d at 729.
13 Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 7, app. 1-2.
,4 181 N.J. Super. at 369, 437 A.2d at 729.
13 Id. The Donovans were informed of the improprieties of the foreclosure proceeding and
the defects in title on April 30, 1980, one day before the scheduled closing. Id. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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the contract for sale from thirteen percent to ten and one-half percent.'6 The Donovans contended that the thirteen percent rate inserted in the contract was usurious in that it exceeded the maximum
legal interest rate allowable at the time the parties entered into the
agreement. 17 Although it was impossible for Mr. Bachstadt to perform the terms of the contract for sale because of his inability to
obtain title, the court granted the Donovans summary relief on both
counts of their complaint. 8 Although the Donovans now had a
judgment for specific performance, 9 Mr. Bachstadt's plan of obtain16 181 N.J. Super. at 369, 437 A.2d at 729. Suit was filed on May 5, 1980 in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Middlesex County. Id.
17 Id. On January 19, 1980, the date the contract was executed, the maximum legal interest
rate for home mortgages was 101/2 %. Id.; see supra note 8 and accompanying text. BL.AcK's LAW
DCTIONARY 1385 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines usury as follows:
Collectively, the laws of a jurisdiction regulating the charging of interest rates. A
usurious loan is one whose interest rates are determined to be in excess of those
permitted by the usury laws. An illegal contract for a loan or forebearance of money,
goods or things in action, by which illegal interest is reserved, or agreed to be
reserved or taken. An unconscionable or exorbitant rate or amount or interest. An
unlawful contract upon the loan of money, to receive the same with exorbitant
increase. The reserving and taking, or contracting to reserve and take, either directly
or by indirection, a greater sum for the use of money than the lawful interest. A
profit greater than the lawful rate of interest, intentionally exacted as a bonus for the
forebearance of an existing indebtedness or a loan of money, imposed upon the
necessities of the borrower in a transaction where the money is to be returned at all
events.
Id. (citations omitted). For an explanation of the effects and purposes of state usury laws, see
Nosari & Lewis, How Usury Laws Affect Real Estate Development, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 30 (1980);
see also Perspective on New Jersey's Usury Law, 96 N.J.L.J. 1256, 1256 (1973).
16 181 N.J. Super. at 369, 437 A.2d at 729. The appellate division noted that the chancery
division had ordered that '" 'Carl Bachstadt specifically perform all obligations required of him
under the contract, subject, however, to the interest rate stated therein of 13 percent being
reformed to be 101/2 ....
Id. (quoting Donovan v. Bachstadt, (Ch. Div.)) (unreported
decision).
The defendants argued that the 13% interest rate was not usurious since on the May 1, 1980
closing, the maximum interest rate allowable had risen above this figure. Since Mr. Bachstadt
never appealed the decision of the chancery division, the appellate division did not review this
issue and left the question open. Id. at 369 n.1, 437 A.2d at 729 n.1.
'9 It is unclear whether the impracticality of Mr. Bachstadt's obtaining title was known by
the chancery division before it ordered specific performance. In the transcripts of the proceedings, this particular issue was not even addressed. Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 96 app.
21. The only question with which the court dealt was whether the interest rate in the original
contract was usurious. Id.
Although the question became moot because the plaintiffs were now seeking damages at
law, the chancery division could have awarded money damages in lieu of the decree of specific
performance. Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 16 app. 63-65 (trial judge questioned whether
fact that Mr. Bachstadt had no title in property was known to chancery judge before he decreed
such remedy); J. POMEROy, A TREArIsE ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1410 (5th ed. 1941).
The equitable remedy of specific performance is generally granted when "the subject matter
of [a] contract is unique in character and cannot be duplicated or because the obtaining of a
substantial equivalent involves difficulty, delay and inconvenience." 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1142 (2d ed. 1964 & Supp. 1980). A classic example of a contract pertaining to a unique
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ing title to the land in dispute from Ms. Lowden had been all but
rendered nugatory by the faulty tax foreclosure action. 20 It soon
became apparent to the Donovans that Mr. Bachstadt could not com2
ply with the trial court's order. 1

Realizing that specific performance was unavailable, the
Donovans instituted this proceeding on July 7, 1980, seeking monetary
relief for the breach of the contract for sale by Mr. Bachstadt.2 2 The
complaint was summarily dismissed by the law division judge, subject
to the Donovans being reimbursed for the costs of the title search and
survey of the property in question.23 The claim for punitive damages 24 and the claim for compensatory damages for the loss of the
bargain 25 of the original mortgage at the reformed ten and one-half
percent interest rate28 were rejected outright.
subject matter where specific performance is usually invoked is a contract for the sale of realty.
G. DOBBS, REMEDiEs § 12.10 (1973); J. POMEROY, supra, §§ 221(b).
As a general principle, when specific performance is initially deemed an appropriate
remedy but subsequently becomes impractical to enforce, courts in equity can retain jurisdiction
and, as an alternative, grant an award of money damages. Dunning v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 483
S.W.2d 423, 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); 6 S. WILUSTON, CONTRACTS, § 1444 (rev. ed. 1936).
However, when a defendant is in such a position that it is impossible for him to comply with a
decree of specific performance, such a remedy will not be granted. Villa Corp. v. S.D. Walker,
Inc., 187 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1951); Robinson-Shore Dev. Co. v. Gallagher, 26 N.J. 59, 138 A.2d
726 (1958) (equity court will not force conveyance of defective warranty deed); J. PoMmoY,
supra, § 1450(b).
10 See supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text.
21 181 N.J. Super. at 369-70, 437 A.2d at 729.
12 Id. The plaintiffs originally filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division,
in Middlesex County. Venue was subsequently changed to Monmouth County because of the
location of the property in dispute. Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 3.
" 181 N.J. Super. at 370, 437 A.2d at 729. The damages sought by the Donovans in their
motion for summary judgment included: "1. $142.85 for the costs of searches, which disclosed
that the defendants did not and never had clear title to said property. 2. $145.00 for the survey of
the subject property. 3. Compensatory damages and 4. Punitive damages." Id.
21 Id. Although the Donovans did not appeal the dismissal of the claim for punitive damages,
the appellate division noted that the law divisions's ruling on the issue was correct. Id. at 370
n.2, 437 A.2d at 729 n.2; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, at 154 (1981)
(remedies for breach of contract generally exclude punitive damages).
25 The loss of the bargain theory of recovery for breach of contract by a vendor of real estate
has been referred to as the "American Rule." Basically, this rule allows an aggrieved purchaser to
recoup "the difference between the contract price and the market value, plus any payments
which have been made." C. MCCORtMICK, DAMAGES § 177, at 680 (1973); see also Annot., 68
A.L.R. 137 (1930). The Donovans saw the loss of the bargain of the mortgage as the difference
between the terms stated in the contract and the terms they would now have to accept in the
mortgage market. 181 N.J. Super. at 370, 437 A.2d at 729; see also Dunning v. Alfred H. Mayer,
Co., 483 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (plaintiff's prayer for relief included interest
increase costs).
The theory of recovery which New Jersey had traditionally followed in breach of land
contracts is based on what is known as the "English Rule," which "limits the purchaser, except
where the vendor has acted in bad faith, to the amount of the deposit paid by the purchaser,
with interest and reimbursement of expenses, or, in other words, the amount which would be
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The sole issue raised on appeal was the Donovans' claim that they
suffered damages because of "the cost of higher financing" caused by
Mr. Bachstadt's breach.2 7 The Donovans asserted that had Mr. Bach-

stadt complied with the terms of the reformed contract, their monthly
payment for a $44,000 mortgage at ten and one-half percent over
thirty years would have been $402.40.21

Because of Mr. Bachstadt's

breach, the Donovans had to obtain new financing with an interest
rate of thirteen and one-quarter percent. The monthly payment of a
mortgage of $44,000 at this percentage rate over thirty years amounts
to $495.35.29 The Donovans claimed that the difference in the
monthly payments of the0 two financing agreements was a compensa3
ble element of damages.
The appellate division modified and remanded the judgment to
3
the trial court for a hearing on the issue of compensatory damages. '
Judge King, writing for the court, began his analysis with an examination of the history of a purchaser's right to recover damages caused by
a vendor's breach of contract for the sale of real estate. 32 At common
law, when a vendor entered into an agreement to transfer real estate
with marketable title, and the title was subsequently found to be
recoverable upon a rescission." C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 178, at 684; see Ganger v. Moffet, 8
N.J. 73, 83 A.2d 769 (1951), cited in Donovan, 181 N.J. Super. at 371, 437 A.2d at 730. But cf.
infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of common law theories of compensation for breach of contract in land sales, see Garland, supra note 4.
25 181 N.J. Super. at 370, 437 A.2d at 729. The trial judge found that the claim for
compensatory damages was too speculative. Id. He concluded "that '[t]he breach of contract was
the breach of the contract to deliver the property. The mortgage financing was only incidental to
Id. (quoting Donovan v. Bachstadt, (Law Div.)) (unreported decithe basic concept ....
sion).
27 Id. The Donovans claimed to have entered into a new agreement to purchase realty with a
higher rate of interest on a new loan commitment. Since the compensatory damages issue was
not given a plenary hearing in the law division, the fact that the Donovans had entered into a
new transaction was not reflected in the record. Id. As the appellate division noted, an offer of
proof on this issue would have aided the court in assessing the claims of the parties. Id.; see N.J.
CT. R. 1:7-3, which provides in pertinent part:
If an objection to a question propounded to a witness is sustained by the court, the
examining attorney may, out of the hearing of the jury (if there is a jury), make a
specific offer of what he expects to prove by the answer of the witness, and the court
may add such other and further statement as clearly shows the character of the
evidence, the form in which it was offered, and the ruling thereon.
Id.
2 Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 11-12.
29 Id.

30 181 N.J. Super. at 370, 437 A.2d at 729. Through the use of simple arithmetic, the
difference in the mortgage agreements over the course of a year is $1,115.40. Over the life of the
mortgage, the difference equals $33,462.
3' Id. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733. The law division award of survey and title search costs was
affirmed. Id.
32 Id. at 370-71, 437 A.2d at 730.
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defective, an aggrieved purchaser's recovery was limited to the
amount of money he may have deposited on the purchase price and
the interest thereon. 3 An exception to this limitation, however, was
made when a vendor "unjustifiably refuse[d] to convey the property,
[did] not convey for reasons within his control, or otherwise create[d]
a situation that disable[d] him from conveying the property"3 4
whereby the purchaser was entitled to recover damages for the benefit
35
of the bargain.

New Jersey provides a statutory remedy, however, for recovery
of deposit money and interest and cost of the title check. 36 According
to the Donovan court, the legislature drafted the present statute, with
the intention of making applicable to realty contracts the general
purpose of damages in contract law-to put the injured party in the
same position he would have been in had the contract been performed. 37 The court further noted that unless otherwise provided in
the contract, the statute removed any common law limitation on the
38
extent of a purchaser's recovery.

" See Ganger v. Moffet, 8 N.J. 73, 79, 83 A.2d 769, 771 (1951); Rabinowitz v. Debow, 104
N.J.L. 62, 64-65, 138 A. 891, 891-92 (1927); Mangonaro v. Kane, 84 N.J.L. 408, 87 A. 94
(1913); Gerbert v. Trustees, 59 N.J.L. 160, 35 A. 1121 (1896); N.J. REV. STAT.§ 2:45-1 (1915)
(repealed 1951), which provided:
Whenever any person shall contract to sell real estate or any interest therein,
and shall not be able to carry out such contract because of a defect in the title to such
real estate or interest therein, the person with whom such contract was made, or his
legal representatives or assigns, shall be entitled to recover from such vendor, in an
action for the breach of such contract, not only the deposit money, with interest and
costs, but also the reasonable expenses of examining the title and making survey,
except where the contract shall provide otherwise; provided, this act shall not limit
the recovery where the purchaser may seek to recover for the deceit or fraud of the
vendor.
Id. For a list of other states which have adopted similar statutes, see C. McCoaNucK, supra note
2.5, § 179, at 687 n.30.
" St. Pius House of Retreats v. Diocese of Camden, 88 N.J. 571, 443 A.2d 1052 (1982); see
also s-upra note 33 and accompanying text & infra note 38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:29-l(West 1951) reads as follows:
When any person shall contract to sell real estate and shall not be able to
perform such contract because of a defect in the title to the real estate, the person
with whom such contract was made, or his legal representative or assigns, may, in a
civil action, recover from the vendor, not only the deposit money, with interest and
costs, but also the reasonable expenses of examining the title and making a survey of
the property, unless the contract shall provide otherwise. This section shall not
preclude the recovery by the purchaserfrom the vendor of any other damages to
which he may be entitled by law.
Id. (emphasis added).
" 181 N.J. Super. at 370, 437 A.2d at 729. See RErsrATmENT (SECOND) oF CONTRACrs, supra
note 24, § 345; 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTACTS § 1338 (3d ed. 1968).
3' 181 N.J. Super. at 371, 437 A.2d at 730.
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This interpretation, however, was subsequently rejected in St.

Pius House of Retreats v. Diocese of Camden.39 In St. Pius House,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the legislature, in drafting
the present statute, did not modify or abrogate the common law
40

limitations on damage recovery for breach of a real estate contract.
The supreme court noted that these limitations do not apply to situations where the vendor's title is found to be defective. 4' Since Mr.
Bachstadt never had title to the disputed property, the question of
whether the title was defective does not arise. While the St. Pius
House court inferred that these damage principles may not be applica-

ble to the Donovan situation, 42 this inference is immaterial for purposes of this Note, which focuses on the Donovan court's examination
of interest increase damages.
The court next examined whether costs of increased interest rates
caused by a breach of contract are compensable items of damages,
ancillary to an award of specific performance. 43 Turning to other
jurisdictions which have specifically dealt with the problem, the court

examined Reis v. Sparks.44 In Reis, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, found no abuse of discretion
in the district court's award of specific performance of an option
contract to purchase realty as well as a monetary award representing
the increased financing and closing costs caused by the seller's
breach. 45 The Reis court reasoned that the delay caused by the seller's
refusal to honor the properly exercised option forced the buyers to
obtain a new mortgage with a higher interest rate. Although the
option contract contained no provisions pertaining to the financing of

- 88 N.J. 571, 443 A.2d 1052 (1982).

Id. at 586-87, 443 A.2d at 1060. Although the supreme court did not examine the
soundness of these common law damage limitations, it noted that:
[The] rule may impose on an innocent buyer a serious loss to the benefit of the seller
who is at fault. This may be peculiarly true when the contract extends over a period
of years while a buyer is making substantial payments upon the principal as well as
improvements to the property.
Id. at 585, 443 A.2d at 1059.
41 Id. at 584, 443 A.2d at 1059.
42 Id. at 587 n.5, 443 A.2d at 1060 n.5.
43 181 N.J. Super. at 372, 437 A.2d at 730.
44 547 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1976).
45 Id. at 238. The buyer-appellants consumated a contract for the sale of a portion of sellerappellee's farmland. At the time of settlement of this contract, the parties entered into a second
agreement giving the buyers an option to purchase the remaining acreage of the seller's land
within two years and a subsequent three-year right of first refusal. Id. at 237-38. When the
buyers notified the sellers of their intention to exercise the option, the sellers totally refused to
communicate about the option and instead instituted suit in the district court seeking a declaratory judgment to settle the rights of the parties under the option contract. Id.
40
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the land4" and the sellers claimed that the interest increase was not a
47
foreseeable item of damages at the time of the contract's execution,
the court noted that the seller had actual notice of the buyer's intention to finance the land through a mortgage. 48 Since the seller refused
to honor the contract even with this notice, the Reis court found the
49
award to be well within the equitable power of the trial court.
The Donovan court next examined Godwin v. Lindbert,5 0
wherein the Michigan Court of Appeals reached a result homologous

to the holding in Reis. 5 Applying the general principle of equity that

"[a] trial court should enforce the equities of the parties in such a
manner as to put them as nearly as possible in the position that they

would have occupied had the conveyance of the real property oc18 Id. at 238. The buyers had initially obtained a mortgage with an interest rate of 71/ %
over 20 years in the amount of $33,000. The lowest interest rate available to buyers because of
the change in the Maryland usury law at the time of the award of specific performance, was
91/s %. Id.
IId. at 2.39.
IId. The sellers cited the rule of the famous English case of Hadley v.Baxendale, 156 Eng.
Rep. 145 (1854), which established the principle that the amounts recoverable in a breach of
contract action were limited to those:
as may fairly and reasonably be considered as either arising naturally, according to
the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Id. at 151. See generally Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 LAw Q. REV.
345 (1931). The seller's contention in Reis was that the costs incurred by the buyer due to the
interest increase were not foreseeable and therefore not recoverable under Hadley v. Baxendale.
547 F.2d at 2.39.
The court of appeals in Reis was quick to answer this contention with the tenet that
ancillary damages given in an award of specific performance are not the same as breach of
contract damages. Id. The former attempts to make the parties whole by enforcing the contract
while the latter computes damages incurred by the contract failing. Since the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale has traditionally only applied to legal damages for the breach of contract, the court
found it inapplicable under the facts with which it was faced. 547 F.2d at 239; see inJra notes
124-25 and accompanying text; Garland, supra note 4; see also Bernardini v. Stefanowicz, 29
Md. App. 508, 349 A.2d 287 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
19547 F.2d at 239-40. The court awarded the buyers an amount of $3,950.63, representing
the increased interest rates and the additional closing costs, discounted to present value at an
annual rate of 5%. Id. at 237-39.
'o 101 Mich. App. 754, 300 N.V.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1980). The sellers in Godwin breached a
contract for sale of real estate which contained a clause for the cash sale of the land as well as a
conventional mortgage. Id. at 756-57, 300 N.W.2d at 515. On the scheduled date of closing, the
defendant, Thomas Lindbert, did not attend because of an injunction obtained by his wife in
connection with a divorce proceeding which enjoined him from contacting the plaintiffs about
the contracted house sale. Id. Mrs. Lindbert's attorney did attend the closing and informed the
buyers that she no longer intended to sell the home. Id. The buyers brought suit seeking specific
performance and damages arguing that their original mortgage commitment had lapsed.
1IId. at 758, 300 N.W.2d at 516. In fact, the appellate court in Godwin noted that the trial
court relied heavily on the holding in Reis in reading its decision to award the interest increase
damages.
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curred when required by the contract,"'5 2 the court found no abuse of
discretion in awarding the difference between the buyer's original
loan commitment and the subsequent mortgage necessitated by the
seller's breach, in addition to specific performance. 5 3
The Donovan court also examined Regan v. Lanze, 54 which allowed for the recovery of the costs of increased interest rates. In
Regan, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
addressed the issue by perfunctorily stating that: "[tihis additional
cost is a predictable consequence arising out of delay in conveying
title." 55
Having analyzed the decisions which allowed recovery,5 6 the

Donovan court addressed the holdings in cases presenting a contrary
view. 5 7 The principal case examined was Dunning v. Alfred H.
Mayer, Co.,-s wherein the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected recovId.; see also 6 S.

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1444 (3d ed. 1968). For an examination of the
use and objective of the remedy of specific performance in contract settings, see J. POMERIOY,
supra note 19, §§ 1400-1410.
-3 101 Mich. App. at 756-57, 300 N.W.2d at 515-16.
u 47 A.D. 2d 378, 366 N.Y.S.2d 512 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds. 40 N.Y.2d
475, 354 N.E.2d 818, 387 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1976).
55 47 A.D. 2d at 383, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
58 181 N.J. Super. at 372-73, 437 A.2d at 731. Although the Donovan court examined the
decisions on the issue under consideration, similar cases have subsequently been decided in
various states. Although some of these decisions will be discussed in this Note, see infra notes 8792 and accompanying text. The list is by no means exhaustive. Cases in which this problem has
been considered include: Reis v. Sparks, 547 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1976); Moore v. Townsend, 525
F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd as modified, 577 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978); Hutton v. Glicksberg,
128 Cal. App. 3d 240, 180 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App. 1982); Cohen v. Meola, 37 Conn. Supp. 27,
429 A.2d 152 (Super. Ct. 1980); Home America, Inc. v. Atkinson, 342 So.2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Godwin v.
Lindbert, 101 Mich. App. 754, 300 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1980). Dunning v. Alfred H. Mayer,
Co., 483 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Regan v. Lanze, 47 A.D.2d 378, 366 N.Y.S.2d 512
(App. Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 475, 354 N.E.2d 818, 387 N.Y.S.2d 79
(1976); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 215 Va. 796, 214 S.E.2d 155 (1975);
Thompson v. Hanson, 6 Wash. App. 1, 491 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1972).
37 181 N.J. Super. at 372, 437 A.2d at 371. One case cited for the rejection of recovery of
interest rate increases simply held that there was no supporting evidence for such an award.
West Hill Constr. Corp. v. Horwath, 149 Conn. 608, 182 A.2d 919 (1962), cited in 181 N.J.
Super. at 372 n.3, 437 A.2d at 731 n.3. Although the Horwath court rejected this theory of
damage recovery, it was unclear from the facts or language of the case whether this was the
theory presented at the trial level. 149 Conn. at 612-13, 182 A.2d at 921.
8 483 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). In Dunning, the plaintiffs contracted with the
defendants to purchase a specific lot of land and have the defendants construct a home on it. Id.
at 424-25. The parties agreed on a purchase price and the plaintiffs obtained a loan commitment
in the amount of $17,600 for 30 years at 6%. Id. at 426. When it became apparent to the
plaintiffs that the defendants were not going to comply with the terms of the contract, they
instituted suit, seeking specific performance and damages. Id. The trial court awarded money
damages, since specific performance was impractical due to the construction of a different
building by the defendants on the lot in question. These money damages which included the
difference between the interest rates which were available to the plaintiffs on the date when
52

1982]

NOTES

925

ery for damages arising out of additional costs of financing.5 The
Dunning court based its decision on the plaintiffs' failure to prove any
injuries resulting from the rise in interest rates. Because no evidence
was offered to show that the plaintiffs had entered into a similar
transaction after they became aware of defendant's breach, damages
were denied. 0 The court held that a judgment "representing the
additional costs of financing due to increased interest rates was remote
and contingent and should not under the circumstances be
awarded." 8 '
At least one commentator has criticized the decision in Dunning
as unsound, stating that:
The reason [the plaintiff] had not applied for a loan elsewhere was
he was still hoping to get specific performance; there is no reason to
suppose that on buying another house he would pay cash for it.
That possibility is the one which is remote and speculative, not the
possibility that on buying a house he will have to borrow money.
62
At least it is a question of fact which possibility is more likely.
The Donovan court perceived this criticism to be overbroad, and
viewed the Dunning decision as simply setting forth an evidentiary
standard requiring a certain level of proof pertaining to the actual
3
damages suffered by the aggrieved home purchaser.
Since the issue of damages arising out of increased interest costs
was one of first impression in New Jersey, the Donovan court turned
to New Jersey law addressing the level of certainty required when
proving the extent of damages in a breach of contract action. 6 4 The

judgment was entered (7'/ %), and the interest rates in the original loan commitment which had
subsequently lapsed. Id. See also supra note 19 for a discussion of the power of equity courts to
award monetary damages when specific performance becomes impractical or impossible.
" 483 S.W.2d at 430.
w Id. at 429.
1,Id. In addition to the lack of evidence offered to show that the plaintiffs had committed
themselves to a new loan agreement, it was established at trial that there was no proof of any
penalty fee charged by the mortgagor for the expiration of the original mortgage. Id.
A. COiaIN, CONTRAcrs § 1098, at 202-03 (Supp. 1980)(emphasis in original).
"1 181 N.J. Super. at 373, 437 A.2d at 731. The importance of proving that a similar
transaction has been entered into by the party seeking interest increase damages is reflected in
the factors which the Donovan court set forth for the trial court to consider in their assessment.
Id. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733. In fact, the Donovan court believed that had this fact been proven
by the plaintiffs in Dunning, the Missouri court would have permitted recovery. Id. at 373, 437
A.2d at 731; see infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Missouri Stare
Decisis: Specific Performance of Contracts for the Sale of Real Estate, 43 UMKC L. REV. 199,
208-09 (1974).
181 N.J. Super. at 374, 437 A.2d at 731-32.
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general principle espoused by authorities 65 and case law88 is that the
uncertainty of damages caused by a breach of contract relates more to
the actual fact that damages have occurred rather than to the extent
or amount of the alleged damages. When it is established that a party
has been wrongfully injured by another's breach of contract, simply
because the resulting damages are not measurable to an exact degree
will not generally bar recovery. 7 As the court pointed out, damages
have never been required to be proven with exactitude or "mathematical precision" by New Jersey courts. 68 The relaxation on the requirement of proving damage amounts with precision has not only been
adopted by the courts of New Jersey, but as was stated in Donovan,
has also been approved by the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted
in New Jersey and in the Restatement on Contracts. 9
Finally, the Donovan court held that the "interests of justice"
required that a hearing be had on the issue of the damages caused by
the breach of contract and the subsequent rise in mortgage interest
rates. 70 The court enumerated several factors which trial courts

"' 5 A. Corbin, supra note 19, § 1020, at 124-27; 11 S. Williston, supra note 37, § 1346, at
240-45 (plaintiff must lay a basis for the extent of harm within reasonable certainty): 25 C.J.S.,
Damages § 28 (1966).
66 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazelton Research, 401 U.S. 321 (1971): First Nat'l Bank v.
Jefferson Mortgage Co., 576 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1978).
' See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat. 141 N.J.
Super. 437, 358 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1976), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 503, 366 A.2d 659 (1976).
("mere difficulty or lack of certainty in proof or finding of quantum of damages does not inhibit
an award to successful party"), Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 230. 219 A,2d
635, 651 (Ch. Div. 1966) ("uncertainty as to measure or extent of damages should not bar
recovery").
" 181 N.J. Super. at 374, 437 A.2d at 731. see also Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403
A.2d 902 (1979). Kozlowski is the seminal case in New Jersey on "palimony." In that case the
supreme court upheld a trial court decision awarding the plaintiff damages for the breach of an
express agreement relating to cohabitation. On the issue of the measure of damages resulting
from the defendant's breach, the court stated:
While the damages flowing from defendant's breach of contract are not ascertainable with exactitude, such is not a bar to relief. Where a wrong has been committed.
and it is certain that damages have resulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount will
not preclude recovery-courts will fashion a remedy even though proof of damages
is inexact.
Id. at 388, 403 A.2d at 908 (citations omitted), cited in 181 N.J. Super. at 375, 437 A.2d at 733.
69 181 N.J. Super. at 374-75, 437 A.2d at 732; see U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 4 (1978),
adopted in New Jersey at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-715 (West 1962) (Code "rejects any doctrine
of certainty which requires almost mathematical precision in proof of loss. Loss may be
determined in any manner which is reasonable under the circumstances"); REsTATEmENT (SrcOND) OF CoNTaAcrs, supra note 24, § 352 comment a, at 144-45 ("A court may take into account
all circumstances of breach, including willfulness, in deciding whether to require a lesser degree
of certainty giving greater discretion to trier of facts").
70 181 N.J. Super. at 375-76, 437 A.2d at 733.
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should consider to arrive at an amount that would best reflect the
actual damage caused by the party in breach and the injury suffered
by the aggrieved purchaser.
The first factor which the Donovan court noted was that a
plaintiff in an interest increase claim is under a general duty to
mitigate damages. 72 All awards of this type were to be reduced to
their present value. 73 Also, "the likely true life of the promised
mortgage" that plaintiffs are forced to enter into because of the defendant's breach was specified as a consideration that must be taken
into account when computing interest increase damages. 74 The
Donovan court noted, however, that the paramount factor a trial
court has to consider is proof that the parties claiming interest increase
damages have entered into a new contract for the purchase of a home
or that at a minimum they were likely to enter into such a transaction
in the near future. 75 Indeed, the court deemed such proof so vital to a
claimant's successful recovery that without such a showing, "any
economic damages are remote and speculative."'7 6

The Donovan

court held that by comparing the aborted loan commitment with the
one that the plaintiff was forced to enter into because of the defendant's breach, the trial court can fashion an award which would ini77
tially reflect the measure of damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
The "'proof of new transaction" factor reflects the court's reliance
on the Dunning decision. 7

By creating an evidentiary standard with

which to comply, the Donovan court recognized the potential for
abuse by a party who has unduly prolonged his search for a new home
until interest rates have risen or alternatively, has not searched in the
housing market at all. In either case, the party claiming injury from
the breach of the original real estate contract has not conformed to his
general duty to mitigate damages, and if a significant delay has
occurred, damages may well be "remote and speculative.

' 79

If the

376, 437 A.2d at 733.
N.J. Super. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733; see infra notes 79 & 80 and accompanying text.
N.J. Super. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733; see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
N.J. Super at 376, 437 A.2d at 733: see infra notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text.
N.J. Super. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733.

ld. at
I'

181
7 181
" 181
71 181
7,

Id.

Id.
7, See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
181 N.J. Super. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733. The Donocan court specifically held that all
plaintiffs in an increased interest cost claim must comply with "their general duty to mitigate
damages." Id.; see also Sommer v. Kriedel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977). The duty to
mitigate has also come to be known as the "Avoidable Consequences Rule." See G. DOBBS, supra
note 19, § 3.7, at 186; C. McCorsi cK, supra note 25, §33, at 127. Simply stated, the rule denies
recovery by an aggrieved party "for any item of damage which could thus have been avoided."
Id.
77
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breaching party can show that the plaintiffs unnecessarily delayed the
subsequent loan search and that a comparable loan commitment
could have been entered into prior to any intervening rises in interest

rates, the trier of fact can adjust the award to reflect the actual harm
caused by the breach.8 0 By allowing the trial court to consider not
only whether the party claiming damages had entered into a new
home financing agreement but also whether circumstances show it
was "likely to do so in the near future," the Donovan court permitted
the trier of fact, in his discretion, to examine certain factors. 8' For

example, a trial court could examine the conditions in the housing
market and the availability of comparable homes in a similarly situated area before ultimately deciding whether there was in fact a good
faith effort on the part of the aggrieved purchaser to relocate and
82
obtain new financing for a new real estate transaction.
One of the devices which the Donovan court indicated the trial
court should use when computing an award for interest increase
83
damages is the reduction of such an award to its present value.
Since this type of award reflects an amount which the plaintiff would
suffer prospectively, reducing it to its present worth would ensure that
the plaintiff is not overcompensated by receiving the lump sum of his
total damages which could be invested immediately, thereby enabling
him to receive windfall profits on money that was supposedly a reflection of his future losses . 4 The United States Supreme Court stated
80 For example, plaintiffs might be limited to recover an amount which represents the
interest increase which occurred within a reasonable time after the contract was breached rather
than recover an amount which represents the difference between the broken loan commitment
and the entered into mortgage after interest increases reach a peak level. If the defendant can
show that the plaintiffs made no attempt to search for a similar house and obtain a new loan
commitment to finance the home's purchase, there would be no injury due to interest increase
and ultimately, no basis for such a recovery. See generally supra note 79 and accompanying text:
C. McCorMICK, supra note 25, § 33, at 130 (defendant has burden of producing evidence to
show that plaintiff could have minimized his losses).
81 181 N.J. Super. at 376, 437 A.2d at 733.
82

Id.

Id.; see supra note 73 and accompanying text. Reducing a lump sum award for future loss
to its present value entails basically three steps. First, the amount of loss must be ascertained.
Second, the period in which the loss will occur must be determined in order to arrive at an
average weekly or monthly rate of loss. Third, these amounts must be adjusted in accordance
with a discount table to arrive at a sum which represents the present value of the total award
which would normally be due at a future date. G. DOBBS, supra note 19, § 8.7. at 570-75:
Leasure, How to Prove Reduction to Present Worth, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 204 (1960). For a source of
discount tables used to discount present value, see G. REEVES, HANDBOOK OF INTEREST, ANNUITY
AND RELATED FISCAL TABLES (1966), cited in G. DoBBs, supra note 19, § 8.7. at 571 n.9.
S" An award discounted to present value should reflect an amount which if invested at a safe
and stable interest rate would enable an injured plaintiff to draw from the award, on a specified
periodic basis, an amount which would compensate for losses at the time when each loss actually
83
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that: "[i]t is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth
more than the like sum of money payable in the future."8 5
The policy reason supporting reduction of future damage awards
to present value also buttresses the Donovan court's rationale for
another factor to be considered by trial courts. Recognizing that many
homeowners do not own one home for the full term of the mortgage
loan commitment, the Donovan court put forth a standard to aid in
the computation of an interest increase award which manifests the
court's desire to equalize, as much as possible, the actual loss caused
by the defendant's breach and the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff. 8 The Donovan court held an interest increase "award should
also represent the likely true life of the promised mortgage."'8 7 This
reasoning is sound because it also attempts to avoid overcompensating
the injured plaintiff.
Assume, for example, that a plaintiff was subjected to interest
increase costs resulting in monthly mortgage payments of $100 more
than would have been required under the first loan commitment
which was lost due to defendant's breach. If the term of the mortgage
was thirty years, it appears that the plaintiff would be entitled to
recover a lump sum representating the increased monthly payments
for the full term. If it is further presumed, however, that ten years
into the loan commitment, the plaintiff prepays the loan in full or sells
to a third party who assumes the existing mortgage, he has then been
compensated for twenty years worth of interest increase costs that in
actuality never materialized. It is this windfall profit that the
Donovan court was cognizant of in formulating the damage stand-

occurs. See supra note 83; Lawless, Compensation of FutureDamages: A View From the Bench,
54 CEo. L.J. 1131 (1961). But see Comment, Variable Periodic Payments of Damages: An
Alternative to Lump Sum Awards, 64 IowA L. REv. 138 (1978).
Using the Donovan case as an example, the plaintiff would be awarded an amount which if
invested in a basic savings account would draw interest at approximately 5 or 6%. To illustrate
this principle, assume that the defendant's breach forced the plaintiffs to have to pay $100 a
month more on their mortgage for a period of 30 years. An award discounted to present value
would reflect an amount which, after withdrawing $100 every month to make up the difference
in their mortgage payments, would leave the plaintiffs with a zero balance in their account after
making the last payment.
For cases addressing interest increase damages which have discounted damage awards to
their present value, see Reis v. Sparks, 547 F.2d at 238; Hutton v. Glicksberg, 128 Cal. App. 3d
240, 180 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App. 1982); Coodwin v. Lindbert, 101 Mich. App. at 756-57, 300
N.W.2d at 515.
11 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916); see also Schaeffer, Uncertainty
and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MaRY L. REv. 719, 719 (1978), in which Professor Schaeffer
states: "A dollar to be paid in the future is worth less than a dollar payable today."
"6 181 N.J. Super at 376, 437 A.2d at 733.
67 Id.
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ard. 88 Although this standard appears to represent the best interests

of both parties concerning the breached contract, in application, it
may be criticized as speculative. 89
The first obstacle to be confronted in the consideration of this
factor demonstrates its weakness in utility. Simply put, how is the
"likely true life" of a particular mortgage computed? It is a recognized
fact in the savings and loan industry that most mortgages are fulfilled
before their date of maturity.9 0 There is a general assumption

throughout the industry that the average true life of a mortgage is
No other reported decision awarding interest damages recognized the possibility of a
plaintiff reaping an unwarranted windfall when liability under the existing mortgage is
extinguished before its full term. See Reis v. Sparks, 547 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1976); Moore v.
Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975), affd as modified, 577 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978); Cohen
v. Meola, 37 Conn. Supp. 27, 429 A.2d 152 (Super. Ct. 1980); Home America, Inc. v. Atkinson,
392 So.2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Hemenway Co. v. Bortex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.
Ct. App. 1977); Goodwin v. Lindbert, 101 Mich. App. 754, 300 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1980);
Regan v. Lanze, 47 A.D.2d 378, 366 N.Y.S.2d 512 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 40
N.Y.2d 475, 354 N.E.2d 818, 387 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1976). In fact, one case specifically rejected
defendant-sellers claim that the plaintiffs stood in a position to reap a windfall profit if the
property was resold before the full term of the mortgage. See Hutton v. Clicksberg, 128 Cal.
App. 3d 240, 180 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App. 1982).
89For purposes of discussion, it must be assumed that the only type of mortgage the Donovan
court addressed in its analysis was the conventional level payment amortized loan. This remains
the most widely utilized type of mortgage, even in the advent of the so-called "alternative
mortgage instrument." G. OsBoRN, C. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 11.4, at 670: see
also STATISTICAL ABsraAcr, supra note 1, at 788 chart 1400.
These instruments have been heralded as an answer to the increasing costs of home financing which prevents many would-be home buyers from entering the housing market. These
instruments have also been seen as an answer to the problems savings institutions face when their
portfolios overflow with old, low-yielding mortgages. Generally, these mortgages offer an initial
interest rate which is more affordable to the borrower, while also remaining flexible enough to
allow the lender to adjust accordingly when existing interest rates rise or decline. Though a
variety of alternative mortgage instruments are presently available, one common feature prevails
throughout, i.e., a variable interest rate that rises or declines in reference to an index reflecting
changes in other interest rates. See Zearley, Alternative Mortgage Instruments and Lender Risks,
164 THE BANKM'S MAG. 61 (1981).
Computing prospective losses in an interest increase claim when an alternative mortgage
instrument is present would not only involve speculation concerning the average life of the
mortgage under the Donovan formula, but would also invoke an examination of the future rises
and declines in the mortgage market likely to occur for the mortgage life expectancy. Thus, the
guesswork a court would employ under a Donovan standard, would be compounded. For
further discussion of the efficiency of a Donovan-type formula when alternative mortgage
instruments are employed, see Garland, supra note 4. For a description of the various types of
alternative mortgage instruments and their efforts and purposes in real estate transactions, see
generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHirrMAN, supra note 7, § 11.4, at 670; Izeman,
Alternative Mortgages: Their Effect on Residential Financing, 10 REAL EsT. L.J. 3 (1981);
Comment, Adjustable Rates in Home Mortgages: A Reconsideration, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 742.
90 U.S. LEAc E OF SAVINGS AsS'Ns, SAVINGS & LoAN FACT BooK '80, 75 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as SAVINGS & LOAN FACT BOOK] ("Although mortgages are generally written with maturities of 20 to 30 years, loan portfolios turn over at a comparatively steady rate and provide a
constant stream of loanable funds").
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twelve years, 9 1 but this figure may be somewhat inflated. 2 Statistical
compilations on the average life of a mortgage show that a variety of
mortgages are aggregated to compute an average, yet, these composites do not differentiate between certain characteristics which most
certainly will effect the accuracy of a median life of a mortgage. 3 The
one characteristic which will have a large impact on the average life
of a mortgage is the mortgage interest rate and yet, mortgages with
low interest rates are averaged with mortgages bearing high interest
rates without differentiating between the possible effects each may
have on prepayment tendencies. 4 Further, one commentator has
pointed out that these figures may not be representative of prepayment patterns because many homeowners paying off mortgages with
low interest rates may be reluctant to enter the market to purchase a
new home when much higher interest rates exist. 5 Regardless of any
statistical data compiled on the average life of a home mortgage,
individual homeowners may be left grossly undercompensated if a
court rigidly employs a figure for an interest increase award which
itself is based on variables such as those discussed above. Also, such an
application disregards the various subjective factors such as the family, age, and health of the mortgagee as well as employment and
community satisfaction which may influence a particular household
in its decision to remain in their home beyond the number of years
which statistics indicate the average mortgage life expectancy to be.
In a case decided subsequent to Donovan, a California court
rejected a claim by the defendant-real estate sellers that an award for

91

Boykin & Philips, Implicationsof the 12-year Prepayment Assumption, MORTGAGE BANKM
38-42 (Nov. 1976); Kinkade, Mortgage Prepaymentsand Their Effect on S & L's, FEDERAL HOME
LOAN BANK BD. J. 12-18 (Jan. 1976); Strunk, The Average Life of a Single Family Mortgage,
FEDEHAL HOME LOAN BANK BD. J. 15-20 (June 1974); see also bibliography supplied by the
MORTGAGE BANKEi'S Ass'N OF AMRICA, PREPAYMENT ExnmuENcE & THE AVERAGE LiFE OF A
MOM-CAGE LOAN (Apr. 1982).
" Comment, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case of Adopting Standards of Reasonableness & Unconscionability, 2 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1111 n.6 (1975) (over 50%
of mortgages in California are paid off before maturity while average home turns over ownership
once every four or five years).
g Strunk, supra note 91, at 16. Mortgages with different loan-to-value ratios, interest rates
and geographic origins are all compiled for the statistical average life of a mortgage. Id. As the
author states: "It can logically be assumed that survivorship data based on a group of mortgages
with such different characteristics cannot be used to indicate accurately the average-life expectancy of groups of mortgages that all have similar characteristics." Id.
04 Id.
95 Garland, supra note 4. See generally SAVINGS & LOAN FACT BOOK, supra note 90, at 41.
Chart 19 indicates a decline in the number of existing one-family homes sold since 1978.
Although this decline does come from a record year of sales in 1978, id. at 40, it nonetheless may
depict homeowners' hesitancy to reenter the housing market.
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interest increase costs over the full term of the mortgage would overcompensate the plaintiff buyers if the property was not held for the
full term of the loan. 6 In Hutton v. Glicksberg,9 7 the court stated
that: "if in the future Buyer's resell the property subject to a 14 % or
higher loan, they will get a lower purchase price than if they could
resell the property subject to a 9 % loan." 98 The Hutton court

found therefore, that the most suitable result would be reached
through a lump sum compensation for the full term of the loan. 99
Although the extent to which a higher interest rate will effect a home's
purchase price is itself subject to conjecture, it is a factor which

weighs most favorably on the side of the aggrieved home purchaser
and the granting of compensation for the full term of the loan. This is
particularly true in light of the general principle in contract law that
doubts as to the quantum of damage are to be resolved against the
breaching party. 0 The Hutton court concluded that any other formula would burden courts with tremendous difficulties in computa0
tion. 1
An alternative method of compensation of an interest increase
award is to authorize periodic payments on either a monthly or annual basis. If the parties were allowed to adjust payments as their
positions changed, such a method of compensation would eradicate
2
the possibility of the plaintiffs being overcompensated. 10
If plaintiffs
refinanced when interest rates declined, the parties may alter pay-

ments accordingly. If the plaintiffs sold the home, the parties may
See infra note 91.
128 Cal. App. 3d 240, 180 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App. 1982).
98 Id. at 147. In Hutton, the parties entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of an
apartment building. The sellers breached by cancelling the arrangement for escrow, and the
buyers brought suit seeking specific performance of the contract and incidental damages for
interest increase costs. Id. at 142, 145. At the time of the contract's execution, the buyers had a
mortgage for $400,000 at 9 % interest for a 30 year term. Id. at 145. At the time of the
judgment, interest rates had increased to 14%. Id. The trial court found that the difference in
the two loan commitments equaled $521,564.40 and awarded the plaintiffs $122,219, the
present value discounted at 14 % of the contract differential. Id. For a discussion of how a given
interest rate may influence the purchase price a home buyer is willing to pay, see Garland, supra
note 4.
180 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48.
100 United States v. American Packing Corp., 125 F. Supp. 788, 791 (D.N.J. 1954) ("risk of
uncertainty must be borne by party through whose fraud or wrongdoing damage was created");
Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat-Chem. & Equip. Co., 141 N.J. Super. 437, 454, 358 A.2d 805, 814
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 503, 366 A.2d 659 (1976); Hodgson v. Applegate, 55 N.J.
Super. 1, 149 A.2d at 839 (App. Div.), a#f'd, 31 N.J. 29 (1959).
"

'

101180 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
102 See Comment,

supra note 84. This method would be extremely helpful if the mortgage in
question were art alternative mortgage instrument where the interest rate was subject to periodic
fluctuations during the life of the loan commitment. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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terminate payments. This method, however, has been severely criticized as placing an undue burden on the administrative machinery of
the court system because the parties would be required to return to
court for adjustments in payments. 10 It also does not take into
consideration higher interest rates reflected in a lower purchase price
if the aggrieved buyer later wishes to sell his home, as was noted in the
Hutton decision. 104
Another alternative formulation for awarding interest increase
damages was suggested in Cohen v. Meola.10 In Cohen, the Connecticut Superior Court awarded an amount equal to a single payment which could be used to purchase an annuity by a home purchaser who suffered interest increase damages. 106 This award, if
invested in an annuity as the court suggested, would guarantee a
monthly payment from an insurance company which would be equal
to the differential between what the plaintiff would have paid under
the lapsed loan commitment and what he was subsequently forced to
pay for a new mortgage because of the defendant's breach of contract.
This type of award is, however, merely a variation of the requirement
set down by the Donovan court that interest increase damages be
reduced to present value. 0 7 Since the annuity award in Cohen was
based on a schedule of monthly payments for twenty-five years, the
possibility of windfall profits to the purchaser if he resells or refinances before the full term of the annuity, is the same as if a lump sum
award for the increased costs was made.
The annuity award for increased interest damages has been taken
one step further. An approach has been advanced which would theoretically alleviate many concerns about over and under compensation
in this type of damage award. 0 8 Under this approach, the court
' Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent? 19 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 295, 319-20 (1969). But see
Comment, supra note 84, at 152-55.
104 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
l05 37 Conn. Supp. 27, 429 A.2d 152 (Super. Ct. 1980).
'0" 429 A.2d at 156-57. In Cohen, the defendants had leased a summer home to the plaintiffs
which gave the plaintiffs a right of first refusal in the event that the defendants wished to sell the
home. Id. at 153. The defendants subsequently received an offer from a third party to sell the
property. Id. When the plaintiffs were informed of this offer, they informed the defendant of
their wish to purchase the premises under the identical terms offered to the third party. Id. at
154. In the meantime, the plaintiffs obtained a loan commitment for $56,250 at 9 1/2 % interest
for a term of 25 years. Id. This commitment ultimately lapsed when the defendants refused to
comply with the plaintiffs' requests to adhere to the original contract offer. Id. The lowest
available interest rates for a similar mortgage at the time of the decision were 141/4 %. Id. at 156;
see also Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975), afJ'd as modified, 577 F.2d 424 (7th
Cir. 1978).
107 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
108 Garland, supra note 4.
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directs the breaching party to purchase an annuity with a fixed term
relative to the full duration of the mortgage, rather than award the
plaintiffs the cost of such an annuity as the court did in Cohen. 09 To
avoid overcompensating the plaintiff, the terms of the annuity would
provide for a type of reverter clause, whereby the annuity would
automatically be reassigned to the breaching party upon sale of the
injured buyer's home or prepayment of the mortgage." 0 Additionally, it is suggested that the buyer receiving the differential provided
by this type of annuity should be required to refinance the mortgage if
interest rates recede to a point where this becomes reasonable."'
Refinancing may partially or totally eliminate the difference in mortgage costs for which the breaching party is liable. If this is the case,
the parties could adjust the annuity payments accordingly.11 2 Furthermore, the courts or the parties themselves can determine a minimum figure to which interest rates must decline before refinancing
would be required." 3 In the event the buyer does not refinance
according to the terms of the agreement, he could be subjected to
penalties which would act as a deterrent to dissuade frivolous lawsuits. 1

4

Seemingly, this method of computation would most accurately
pinpoint the amount of future damages and would directly effectuate
the Donovan mandate pertaining to damage mitigation."t 5 It remains to be seen, however, whether courts will be willing to adopt so
elaborate a formula. A court would be required to project a minimum
interest rate at which point the plaintiff would be required to refinance. Additionally, courts may find themselves confronted at a later
date with claims by either of the parties that the purchase should or
should not be refinanced, regardless of deterring penalty costs. An
additional criticism of the use of annuities for future damage awards is
'0 Id.; see also infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.

110Garland, supra note 4. A different type of annuity would simply terminate upon the
buyer's resale of the house. In this case, the author suggests that the purchase price of the annuity
should be lower than the type discussed in the text because of the probability that the true life of
the mortgage will be less than its full term. Id. This approach, however, contains the same type
of speculation that surrounds computation of lump sum payments based on the statistical
average mortgage interest term. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
Il See Garland, supra note 4.

Id. It is suggested that a partial reduction of the mortgage rate by refinancing would
enable the buyer to reassign a partial portion of the annuity payment to the breaching seller. Id.
A total reduction would provide for a total reassignment.
113 Id.
"I Id. Such penalties might include losing a portion or all of the annuity payments and in
egregious cases awarding counsel fees and costs. It is contended that these penalties would act as
a sufficient deterrent to buyers not complying with the terms of the agreement. Id.
'Is See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
112

1982)]

NOTES

935

that the defendant purchasing such an annuity is not only compensating the plaintiff, but is also paying for the profits and overhead of the
annuitant. Under the type of agreement discussed above, the defendant would also be required to bear the costs of plaintiffs' refinancing
as well." 6 Since this means that the defendant is being held liable for
an amount greater than the actual injuries sustained, the annuity costs
may be seen as improper items of damages. 11 7 Though this theory of
compensation does keep the best interests of the parties in mind, the
complexities that arise in employing so intricate a formula are exactly
what prompted one court to forecast "tremendous practical difficulties in attempting to fashion a remedy which would involve Sellers in
providing partial financing to Buyers over an indefinite period of time
or which could require the parties to come back to court if Buyers
8
resold or refinanced the property." 1
One consideration which the Donovan court failed to discuss was
whether the increased interest costs should be classified as general or
consequential damages. 19 In contract law damages are classified as
general when they are deemed to have flowed directly from the
breach of the contract and result naturally as a consequence of the
breach.2 0 Because general damages are viewed as obvious consequences of the breach, they usually require little proof on their fore2
seeability.1 1
Damages classified as consequential are those necessitating proof
that they were within the contemplation of the parties at the contract's execution.12 2 Because these damages are considered unusual in
that they are not the natural consequence of the contract's breach, the
requirement of proof of knowledge or reasonable foreseeability protects breaching parties from liability. Therefore those who were not or
should not be aware of special or unusual circumstances resulting
23
from a breach are free from liability.
See Garland, supra note 4.
Lawless, supra note 84, at 1139; see also Farmers Union Federated Co-op. Shipping Ass'n.
v. McChesney, 251 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1958): Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1454 (1957).
114180 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
119See supra note 48 and accompanying text for the limitation of damage principles set forth
in Hadley v. Baxendale.
110 See Paris of Wayne v. Richard A. Hajjar Agency, 174 N.J. Super. 310, 318-21, 416 A.2d
436, 441-43 (App. Div. 1980); Garland, supra note 4; RESTATEMENT (FnssT) or CoNTmAcrs §
330, at 509 (1932).
" See supra note 120.
"21 See Weiss v. Revenue Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.J.L. 208, 182 A. 891 (1936); 11 S.
WILuSTON, supra note 37, §§ 1347-1357, at 251-98; Garland, supra note 4. See generally
Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249
(1975).
323 See supra note 117.
1"
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All of the previously discussed non-New Jersey cases which the
Donovan court analyzed dealt with interest increase damages as an
ancillary award to specific performance.1 24 Since these cases were
decided in equity, the rules limiting contract damages discussed above
are inapplicable because these types of awards are generally looked
upon in equity as compensation, rather than as awards of legal damages. 125
Examination of decisions similar to Donovan dealing with increased interest costs in the sphere of legal damages for breach of
contract reveals a tendency, albeit a small one, to classify these damages as consequential. 126 For example, in Roanoke Hospital Association v. Doyle & Russell, Inc.,'127 the Virginia Supreme Court held that
increased interest costs caused by delays in construction must be considered consequential damages. 28 Noting that it was not the construction delays which caused the increase in interest rates, but rather
unpredictable pressures in a volatile money market, the court concluded that "increases in interest rates are 'special circumstances,' and
damages resulting therefrom are consequential and not compensable
unless such circumstances were within the contemplation of the par9
2

ties."1

M4See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
123 See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1204, 1206 (1949), where it is stated:
The compensation awarded as incident to a decree for specific performance is
not breach of contract and is therefore not legal damages. The complainant affirms

the contract as being still ini force and asks that it be performed. . . often the result is
more like an accounting between the parties than like an assessment of damages.
Id.

'" See Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 215 Va. 796, 803, 214 S.E.2d 155, 161
(1975) ("damages resulting from increased interest rates are not direct damages"); Thompson v.
Hanson, 491 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ct. App. 1972) ("evidence does not sustain conclusion that wide
swing in interest rates was within contemplation of parties at time contract was signed; nor was
it reasonably foreseeable at that time").
127 215 Va. 796, 214 S.E.2d 155 (1975). In Roanoke, the defendants entered into a construction contract with the plaintiffs which required the construction of a new wing on the plaintiffs'
existing facilities. The plaintiffs had obtained a loan commitment for a $5,500,000 mortgage
payable over 15 years at 6% %, which was contingent upon the completion of construction by
October 13, 1970. Id. at 797, 214 S.E.2d at 15. Completion of the project was delayed for a
variety of reasons. When it became apparent to the plaintiffs that the date set for completion in
the loan commitment would not be met, they obtained and subsequently exercised an option for
permanent financing. Id. at 798, 214 S.E.2d at 158-59. The new loan commitment was identical
to the original except that the interest rates had risen from 6/ % to 8/2 %. The plaintiffs
brought suit to recover, among other things, the increased interest costs allegedly due to the
defendants' delay. The trial court denied recovery for the increased costs of financing but
awarded the plaintiffs damages sustained during the construction delay period. id. at 800, 214
S.E.2d at 159. The supreme court, noting that both of these awards were properly labeled
consequential damages, found the verdict to be "irreconcilably inconsistent" and remanded the
case for a new trial on the issue of consequential damages. Id. at 804-05, 214 S.E.2d at 162.

128Id. at 803, 214 S.E.2d at 161.
129 Id.
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This reasoning is applicable to a Donovan situation. The increase
in interest rates to which any home purchaser is subjected cannot be
the direct result of a real estate vendor's breach of contract. Home
mortgage interest rate increases result from a number of variables
affecting the economy, primary among which are corresponding rises
in inflation rates and the cost of purchasing a home. 130 Another
factor affecting mortgage interest rates is that many lending institutions have retained in their portfolios long-term loans at preinflation
interest rates. The low rate of return from these loans makes it difficult to offset the short-term obligations to customers who invest in
savings accounts which yield higher interest rates. 3 ' As one commentator has noted, a home purchaser who takes out a mortgage for
fifteen or sixteen percent today, can be seen as subsidizing the home
purchaser of yesterday who has a low mortgage interest rate which
still remains in the lending institution's portfolio. 132 Therefore, the
injury suffered by a home buyer subjected to a vendor's breach of the
contract for sale, could not be that which arises naturally or "according to the usual course of things"'33 when a contract is breached, but
rather that caused by special circumstances which must be in the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting before recovery
34
is allowed, i.e., consequential damages.
The question remains, ultimately, whether at the time the parties
in Donovan entered into the bargain, increase interest damages were
a reasonably foreseeable result of a real estate vendor's breach of a
"0 See MeTernan & Nagel, The GPMIVRM: A Mortgage For Inflationary Times, Mor'GAcE
BANKER 39 (Oct. 1981) (chart 1, id. at 42, shows correlation over last 20 years between increases

in inflation, home appreciation rates, income growth and mortgage rates). See generally Izeman, supra note 89.
"I Savings and loan associations obtain a large portion of the money which they make
available for home loans from turnovers in their mortgage loan portfolios and from short term
deposits. SAVINGS & LOAN FACT BOOK, supra note 90, at 75. To obtain short term deposits, these
institutions must attract investors by offering favorable returns on investments through high
interest rates on savings accounts to offset the problems caused by holding more than 80% of
their assests in mortgage loans. Id. at 66. When a large number of low yielding interest rate
mortgages are held by savings and loan associations, it becomes difficult to affect the higher
interest rates paid to their savings depositors. See G. OsBorNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN,
supra note 7,at 672; Thomas, Alternative Residential Mortgagesfor Tomorrow, 26 THE PRAC.
LAW. 55 (1980); Comment, Renegotiable Rate Mortgages: Keeping Pace With a Fluctuating
Economy & Equalizing Competition Within the Home FinancingIndustry, 10 STMSON L. REv.
293, 294 (1981).
lzeman, supra note 89, at 4.
I31
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
'3'But see Garland, supra note 4. The author imputes knowledge on the part of a real estate
vendor as to the volatility of home mortgage interest rates in his conclusion that these interest
increase costs can be viewed as natural consequences of a breach of contract, i.e., direct
damages. Id.: see also notes 122 & 123 and accompanying text.
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land contract. 3 5 Prospective home buyers are faced with one of two
options when purchasing a home: either to pay cash or some equivalent for the home or to have the transaction financed. Considering
that the price of existing and new homes has risen at a rate of over two
hundred percent since 1970,136 it is easy to understand why the majority of home buyers finance their purchases through the use of a
mortgage; 1 37 they simply cannot afford to pay for a home in cash.
With this factor in mind, it is a fair assumption that because the vast
majority of home purchases are financed through mortgages, the
average home buyer would be familiar with not only the exorbitant
price of homes but also the state of the mortgage market and interest
rates accompanying it. Since a real estate vendor must be aware of the
existing market price of homes at the time he wishes to sell, he should
also be aware that the majority of prospective home buyers will be
financing the purchase through a mortgage.138 Given that increased
interest rates are an oppressive and well publicized reality, 39 it is not
unreasonable to assume that parties who enter into a real estate
contract in today's market are cognizant that interest rates for home
mortgages are subject to fluctuation.

40

"5 See supra notes 122 & 123 and accompanying text; see also C. McCoRucKc, supra note 25,
§ 138, at 565, in which it is stated:
This standard [for consequential damages] is in the main an objective one. It takes
account of what the defendant who made the contract might then have foreseen as a
reasonable man, in the light of the facts known to him, and does not confine the
inquiry to what he actually did foresee.
Id.
138STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 486, 778-80; see also SAvINs & LOAN FACT BooK,
supra note 90, at 20, 23. Statistics compiled by the Department of Housing and Urban Development show that in 1973, over 70 % of the homes sold in the United States had a purchase price of
less than $40,000. By 1979, only 10% of newly bought homes had purchase prices less than this
figure. Id. at 23 chart 9.
131STATISTICAL ABsTAcr, supra note 1, at 788. Statistics show that over 84% of new homes
purchased since 1970 have been financed through the use of a mortgage. Id.; see also Garland,
supra note 4 ("Mortgage financing is so much a part of average real estate purchase and
sufficiently frequent, that vendor alleging ignorance of purchaser's financing displays a level of
understanding beneath that acceptable from a reasonable person").
138 Increase in housing prices also represents increases in the value of existing homes. SAVINGs
& LOAN FACr BooK, supra note 90, at 41 (average price of existing homes rose to $64,000 in
1979).
139 See supra note 132. Whether a vendor had notice that a home buyer would be using a
mortgage to finance the purchase was not at issue in Donovan since Mr. Bachstadt had taken
back a purchase money mortgage himself. 181 N.J. Super. at 369, 437 A.2d at 729. This factor
has, however, influenced decisions on whether these damages were foreseeable. Reis v. Sparks,
547 F.2d at 239; Hutton v. Clicksburg, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47; Cohen v. Meola, 429 A.2d at
156.
140 The rise in mortgage interest rates has been the topic of discussion in legal journals and
periodicals; e.g., Nat'l L.J., March 22, 1982, at 1, col. 4; Nat'l L.J., March 15, 1982, at 11; 107
N.J.L.J. 236 (1981); in newspapers, and magazines; e.g., N.Y. Times, August 16, 1981, § 8, at 1;
see also Garland, supra note 4.
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However one phrases the issue, whether damages caused from
interest increases when a breach of contract occurs will be considered
foreseeable or within the contemplation of the parties is a question
that must be resolved by the trier of fact. 1 " A contracting party may
not know the particular way injury will result if the contract is
breached; nor may he necessarily foresee each item of damage or the
extent of the possible harms. These factors should not, however, act as
a bar to an injured plaintiff's recovery when the circumstances show
that a breaching defendant had reason to foresee the possibility that
certain injuries might occur upon a breach of contract. 42 Based upon
this standard of foreseeability, a reasonable person, possessing knowledge that the party with whom he is contracting will be financing the
purchase of a home in a mortgage market whose instability has become almost common knowledge, should not escape liability for a
buyer's cost of higher financing arising from his breach by claiming
that these items of damage were not within the contemplation of the
parties.
The ultimate goal of the Donovan court was to put forth a
formula for the computation of interest increase damages that would
subsume all the principles of law that normally apply in a contract
setting. Primary among these principles is the tenet that the parties
141 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 19, § 1012, at 89; C. McCoamicx, supra note 24, § 140 at 574.
Indeed, one commentator has gone as far as to say that the question of foreseeability is so
subjective that it retains little validity. See G. DoBBs, supra note 19, § 12.3, at 814. He states:
The idea is so readily subject to expansion or contradiction that it becomes in fact
merely a technical way in which judges can state their conclusion. Unless there is
proof that the parties specifically mentioned an item of damage in contracting, the
judges are free to describe that item as an unforeseeable one.
Id.
"I C. DoBas, supra note 19, § 12.3, at 812; see also 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 19, § 1012, at 88
("the rule does not require that anything should have been foreseeable to a dead certainty;
seldom can anything be predicted with such assurance as that"); 6 S. WILISTON, supra note 37,
§ 1347, at 251-52 ("when a defendant has reason to know .. . of facts indicating that unusual
damages will follow or may follow his failure to perform his agreement, he is liable for such
damages") (emphasis added).
This interpretation of the foreseeability rule has also been applied in commercial settings
and is embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code which allows for the recovery of consequential damages by a buyer for losses which the seller had reason to know of at the time of
contracting. U.C.C. § 715(a)(2)(1978). As stated by White and Summers:
The better-reasoned authority emerging from [the] background (of Hadley v. Baxendale] and the intent of the draftsmen declare that the basic test for the recovery of
consequential damages is whether the losses were foreseeable (not foreseen) by the
seller at the time he entered the contract. The trend of Code cases to date strongly
suggests that the courts will construe this foreseeability requirement to the plaintiff's
benefit.
J. WjirTE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-4, at 325 (1972), cited in Paris of
Wayne v. Richard A. Hajjan Agency, 174 N.J. Super. at 320, 416 A.2d at 442.
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incident to a breach of contract should only be put in the position they
would have enjoyed had the contract been performed. 4 3 It is ironic,
then, that the issue of determining the likely true life of a mortgage,
which distingushes the Donovan court's decision from the other cases
addressing the issue of interest increase damages is the factor that
makes such a formula so difficult to ascertain.
A number of considerations reveal, however, that the approach
taken by the Donovan court is the most economical and appropriate
method of computation for both the courts and the parties involved.
Courts are generally allowed a wide degree of discretion in determining what method of damage computation they wish to employ.' 44
First, there was clearly no abuse of discretion on the part of the
Donovan court in utilizing the standard it set forth. Secondly, the
Donovan approach attempted to find an amount of damages that best
equalizes the actual damage sustained and the injury caused while at
the same time minimizing the necessity of the parties returning to
court at a future date to reassess or redesign payment procedures.
Although statistics have shown a solid pattern of mortgage prepayment,1 45 there is always the possibility that a party who prevails in
an interest increase claim will not fit into the statistical prepayment
norm. Statistics representing the average life expectancy of a mortgage are merely compilations of what the trend of mortgage prepayments has been, from which, predictions of what mortgage prepayments will be, can be made. What the average life expectancy of a
mortgage is, becomes unanswerable when one realizes that, "[n]o one
can really answer this question because to do so would require looking
into the future." 46 If a court examines certain circumstances unique
to each plaintiff in these types of claims, the possibilities of over or
undercompensation may be further minimized. The age and previous
moving history of a family may be relevant in deciding whether a
mortgage life expectancy should be greater than the statistical average. This would involve a certain amount of guesswork on the part of
the trier of fact but since this entire theory of compensation is based on
probabilities, consideration of a plaintiff's present living situation
should not negatively affect a court's formulation. Also, if a court
143 In re Van Dyk Research Corp., 13 Bankr. 487 (D.N.J. 1981); Giumarra v. Harrington
Heights, 33 N.J. Super. 178, 109 A.2d 695 (App. Div. 1954), aJJ'd, 18 N.J. 548, 114 A.2d 720

(1955).
144 Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Conklin Assoc., 152 N.J. Super. 1, 377 A.2d 740
(Law Div.), aJ'd, 167 N.J. Super. 392, 400 A.2d 1208 (App. Div. 1977); Endress v. Brookdale
Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 364 A.2d 1080 (App. Div. 1976).
145 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
14 Strunk, supra note 19, at 15.
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wishes to employ a statistical base for the average life of a mortgage,
perhaps an additional term could be added to reach a conservative
estimate. For example, since the vast majority of thirty year mortgages are not held for their full term, a court could approve a term of
payment covering fifteen or twenty years. This indicates an awareness
of the probability of prepayment and minimizes the risk of undercompensation. Again, the extenuating circumstances of each individual
plaintiff should influence such a result.
By recognizing the problems inherent in an increase interest
claim, the New Jersey Appellate Division in Donovan showed insight
and a willingness to confront a factor that has heretofore been rejected
or unrecognized. In the final analysis, any formula used in an increased interest claim which attempts to reduce excessive court involvement, while attempting to maintain the best interests of the
parties, will involve a certain amount of speculation. A court applying
the rationale for interest increase claims as set forth in the Donovan
decision, can deal with problems of speculation and continue on what
appears to be the correct road of recovery for so unique a type of
damage award.
Patrick T. Collins

Errata
Volume 12:4, page 916, footnote 4 should read:
Garland, Purchasers Interest Rate Increases: Caveat Venditor, 27
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript copy on file at Seton
Hall Law Review).

